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Suburban State Legislators and 
School Finance 
Keith A. Boeckelman 
Western Illinois University 
Much contemporary research suggests that suburbanites 
constitute a relatively distinct political group given their 
comparatively strong support for low taxes and local 
control of government services . This article considers 
whether suburban preferences in the areas of taxation 
and local control affect state policy decisions on school 
funding . Specifically examined is the proposition that 
suburban state legislators are more likely than those 
from urban and rural areas to oppose educational fund-
ing plans that use statewide taxes . The analysis begins 
with a case study of Illinois, but includes comparisons 
with three other states. A number of tentative conclusions 
are drawn from the analysis , including the observation 
that partisanship seems more important than region in 
explaining suburban legislators' voting patterns on 
school funding. 
The migration from cities to suburbs has been one of the most notable demographic developments of the post-World War Il era in the United States. While scholarship 
of the 1950s and 1960s showed that suburbanization had little 
impact on political behavior, more recent studies have called this 
conclusion into question. Contemporary research suggests that 
suburbanites are distinct in that they are especially likely to sup-
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port low taxes and favor devolution of services to local levels of 
government (Gainsborough 2001 ). 
This article considers whether suburban preferences in the ar-
eas of taxation and local control affect state policy decisions on 
school funding. Specifically examined is the proposition that 
suburban legislators are more likely than those from urban or 
rural areas to oppose educational funding plans that use state-
wide taxes to equalize resources. The analysis begins with a case 
study of Illinois. Due to the limits of case studies in reaching 
general conclusions, comparisons with three other states-
Michigan, Georgia, and Maryland-are also included. 
BACKGROUND 
Historically, conflict among regions has played an important 
role in shaping state policy choices (Palmer 1972). During the 
first two-thirds of the twentieth century, urban-rural tensions de-
fined many intra-state political battles. According to Key, ''the 
differences between metropolitan people and the outstaters form 
an enduring basis for party competition ... " (1956, 230). Before 
the Supreme Court's Baker v. Carr decision, rural areas often 
had the upper hand, as "malapportionment in the states imposed 
serious handicaps on the states' capacity to deal with contempo-
rary social issues" (Palmer 1972, 32). 
After the states redrew their legislative districts according to 
population criteria in the 1960s, metropolitan areas gained 
greater representation in the legislatures. As a result, policies that 
responded to urban concerns found greater favor (Van Horn 
1996, 2-3). Meanwhile, however, the balance of power in metro-
politan areas themselves was changing, as suburbs grew in popu-
lation, and many cities lost residents. As of the 1990 Census, 
over half of the U.S. population resided in the suburbs, and sub-
urban legislators accounted for a majority or plurality in many 
legislatures. According to Nardulli (1989, 16), the result has been 
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the emergence of "a new regional force in state politics, one that 
looks as imposing as the burgeoning cities of a century ago." 
In purely demographic terms, then, the suburbs appear to be 
well-positioned to exert political power. Nevertheless, there are 
at least two reasons why they may not dominate legislative pol-
icy decisions. First, suburban interests may be too diverse to al-
low a cohesive coalition to develop. While some suburbs may fit 
the stereotype of well-off, homogeneous enclaves, "the suburban 
bloc includes a growing number of aging towns beset by urban 
migration, fiscal scarcity, and a whole range of problems not too 
different from the cities they adjoin" (Erhenhalt 1993, 8). As a 
result, Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom (2001, 232) believe 
that suburbia will not speak with one voice, and that political 
coalitions pitting urban areas and older "inner" suburbs against 
more recently settled areas are emerging. Given their size advan-
tages, cities would probably retain the upper hand in such coali-
tions. 
A second factor that may limit suburban power is that subur-
ban legislators may not promote a regional agenda. To begin 
with, legislators may not respond directly to their constituents' 
concerns. While Rosenthal et al. (2003) argue that constituency 
preferences are a key factor in determining legislators' votes, a 
study of school finance votes in the New Hampshire legislature 
found that legislators often voted against their constituents 
wishes (Campbell and Fischel 1996). The increasing prominence 
of interest groups in state legislatures, documented by Thomas 
and Hrebenar (1999) may reinforce any tendencies toward non-
responsiveness. Specifically, Weir (1995) argues that rising inter-
est group influence in state legislatures has undermined the 
power. of regional coalitions. 
Whatever regional conflict does exist can manifest itself in a 
number of areas. In this article, I focus on education finance, 
specifically efforts to equalize funding among richer and poorer 
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districts through increased state responsibility. Efforts to equalize 
education funding have pervaded state politics for over 30 years. 
Since 1970, every state has tried at least once to equalize school 
finances (Hoxby 2001 ). Moreover, good schools are a primary 
reason that people choose to live in the suburbs, but education 
funding is an issue that resonates in all regions (South and 
Crowder 1997). 
Education funding presents complicated dilemmas for subur-
ban politicians. On the one hand, suburbanites should favor local 
financing of the schools through property taxes, over statewide 
sales or income taxes, as the latter require them to foot the bill 
for education in less affluent rural and urban areas (Thomas 
1998; Schneider 1992). On the other hand, however, high prop-
erty taxes have been a suburban hot button, since at least the tax 
revolt of the late 1970s. A poll of Chicago suburbanites, for ex-
ample, showed that nearly three times as many respondents were 
concerned with the issue of rising property taxes as were worried 
about school quality.1 Suburban politicians, then, may feel pres-
sure to oppose statewide education funding, while trying to ease 
their constituents' local tax bills. Emphasizing the latter as a pol-
icy goal may lead to conflict between suburban legislators and 
those from other regions who fear that property tax cuts will lead 
to shifts in funding formulas. Further complicating the picture is 
the fact that the actual policy impact of regional redistributi on 
through the legislative process is uncertain. While court-ordered 
plans to change education funding formulas have generally re-
duced inter-district inequality, some redistribution schemes can 
actually harm poorer districts as well as wealthier ones (Murray, 
Evans, and Schwab 1998; Hoxby 2000). 
1 Stanley Ziemba, "Suburban Dream Loses Luster for Many Residents," Chicago Trib-
une, 26 August 2001, p . 4-1. 
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The following sections examine suburban legislators' votes 
on school finance issues and contrast them with those of repre-
sentatives of other regions. The analysis begins with a case study 
of Illinois. Illinois was chosen because it is fairly representative 
of national trends. According to Barone (2001, 494), "its mixture 
of blacks and whites and Hispanics, immigrants and pioneers, 
city-dwellers and suburbanites and farmers, the affiuent and im-
poverished, heavy industry and high-tech, make it a rough proxy 
for the nation." No matter how representative, however, single 
state case studies are more valid when they include comparisons 
to other states (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2002, 418). There-
fore, subsequent sections contrast Illinois' experience with those 
of states that differ on relevant cultural, regional, and demo-
graphic variables. 
The analysis requires that the concepts of "suburb" and "sub-
urban legislator" be clarified. Unfortunately, a consensus defini-
tion does not exist (Jackson 1985). Rusk (1995, 6) considers 
suburbs to be the areas lying outside the borders of a central city, 
but within a metropolitan region, as defined by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. Building on this definition, I define "suburban" in the 
four states under consideration as the metropolitan area popula-
tion living outside a central city of at least 250,000. The popula-
tion restriction focuses the analysis on larger expanses that 
include several legislative districts. 
Based on this definition it is possible to identify suburban ar-
eas for each of the four states in the analysis. For Illinois, the 
relevant territory is defined as Cook County outside of Chicago, 
as well as seven surrounding counties-DuPage, Grundy, Kane, 
Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will. In addition, five counties in 
the St.Louis metropolitan area-Clinton, Jersey, Madison, Mon-
roe, and St. Clair-fit the definition. Suburban areas of Michigan 
are defined as Wayne County, excluding Detroit, and Lapeer, 
Livingston, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, and St. Clair counties. 
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In Georgia, the suburban area consists of Fulton County (exclud-
ing Atlanta), plus Barrow, Butts, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Co-
weta, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinett, 
Henry, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, Spalding, and Walton coun-
ties. Finally, Maryland has suburban areas surrounding Baltimore 
and Washington, D.C. For Maryland, the following counties are 
included: Baltimore (excluding Baltimore City), Anne Arundel, 
Carroll, Harford, Howard, and Queen Anne. The Washington, 
D.C. suburban counties are Calvert, Charles, Frederick, Mont-
gomery, and Prince George's. 
All of the designations above are based on U.S. Census Bu-
reau {1992) definitions of metropolitan areas. For Atlanta, Balti-
more, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C., the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) was used. For Detroit, the Primary Met-
ropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) was the relevant metropolitan 
unit, and for Chicago the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (CMSA) defined the suburban region. Only portions of the 
relevant metropolitan regions that are in the four states studied 
are included in the analysis. 
Suburban legislators are defined as those who represent dis-
tricts in the counties listed above. Because legislative districts 
must be equal in population, many districts span suburban and 
urban or suburban and rural areas, however. In such cases, legis-
lators were classified according to where their district offices 
were located. In other words, if the office or official address is in 
a suburban area, the district is defined as suburban, if not it is 
categorized in the appropriate urban or rural category. This ap-
proach makes it possible to replicate this study in the many states 
where population breakdowns of legislative districts are not 
available. 
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ILLINOIS CASE STUDY 
Background 
An individualistic culture, regional conflict, and the legacy of 
the Chicago machine interact to shape Illinois' political context. 
Elazar (1984) identifies Illinois as an individualistic state where 
professional politicians focus on benefiting themselves and their 
allies, rather than pursuing an abstract public interest. Quixotic, 
or even idealistic, efforts to find statewide solutions clash with 
the state's pragmatic parochialism. According to a leading text-
book on the state's politics, "good services and good schools 
everywhere would be nice, the voters and their leaders seem to 
say, but if it means consistently higher tax effort, perhaps the 
current system will be good enough after all" (Gove and Nowlan 
1996, 218). 
Regional conflict has also played a central role in Illinois 
politics. Polls indicate that policy preferences differ among rural, 
urban, and suburban parts of the state, and that the different areas 
exhibit at least a mild distrust of each other's legislators (Nar-
dulli and Krassa 1989). From 1901 to 1955 rural areas held sway, 
fending off the growing power of Chicago by refusing to redis-
trict the legislature (Frank, Nardulli, and Green 1989). After a 
population-based redistricting in the 1960s, the existence of the 
nation's last viable big city political machine allowed the mayor 
of Chicago to dominate legislative decision making for a brief 
period (Gove and Nowlan 1996, 43). Through patronage and the 
power to slate candidates for higher political offices on the De-
mocratic ticket, the mayor could control the votes of city legisla-
tors. 
While the death of Mayor Richard J. Daley in 1976 threw the 
Chicago machine into turmoil, demographic trends were already 
weakening the machine's hold on the state legislature at the ex-
pense of the suburbs. In the latter half of the 20th Century, the 
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suburban population eligible to vote approximately tripled, while 
the state's overall population grew slowly (Anderson, Blair, and 
Landy 1997). Changes in the makeup of the legislature have mir-
rored these demographic shifts. Between the 1960s and 1990s 
Chicago and suburban areas effectively traded places in terms of 
levels of representation. During this period Chicago dropped 
from over 40% of the seats in each house of the legislature to 
barely 25%, while the suburbs gained what Chicago had lost. 
School Finance in Illinois 
As noted, one expects suburbanites to oppose statewide in-
come or sales taxes to finance education because these taxes 
force suburban residents to subsidize other districts. In Illinois, 
according to Gove and Nowlan (1996, 177) suburban elected 
officials "chafe at appeals that more of their taxpayer dollars be 
distributed to Chicago and to downstate schools to reduce dis-
parities in per pupil spending." Further evidence of suburban 
opposition to statewide funding comes from voting patterns in a 
1992 referendum. The ballot question involved an unsuccessful 
effort to amend the Illinois Constitution to place "preponde rant" 
( at least 50%) financial responsibility for school funding on the 
state government. While the statewide average vote was 57% in 
favor, and Chicago residents supported the plan by a margin of 
73%, only one of the eight Chicago suburban counties (Kendall) 
exceeded 50% support (Illinois State Board of Elections 1992).2 
Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that the suburbs' rise to demo-
graphic prominence in Illinois coincided with an erosion in state 
aid, from 47% of total school funding in 1975 to 27% by the late 
2 Rob Karwath and Sue Ellen Christian, "Education Amendment Falling Short," Chicago 
Tribune, 4 November 1992, p. 2-1. 
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1990s3 (Hovey and Hovey 2000). As a result, dramatic differ-
ences in per pupil funding between richer and poorer districts 
appeared. Beginning in the late 1980s, the legislature began to 
consider various plans to alter school aid. None succeeded, but 
examining two prominent legislative efforts in the 1990s allows 
a better understanding of the regional dynamics of the education 
finance issue, and provides an opportunity to examine the propo-
sition that suburban legislators oppose statewide school funding 
mechanisms. 
The first plan involved the unsuccessful 1992 effort to amend 
the Illinois constitution to require the state to provide at least 
50% of total school funding. Table 1 shows a regional break-
down of the legislative vote to put this proposal on the statewide 
ballot combining members of both the House and Senate. Legis-
lators were categorized by the area they represent into three 
categories: "Chicago," "suburban," and "downstate." Only legis-
lators who voted either ''yes" or "no" were included in the calcu-
lations. 
The results show that suburban legislators were far less likely 
than those from other regions to support an increase in the state's 
share of educational funding. While at least 80% of Chicago and 
downstate legislators favored state funding increases, only 
slightly more than one-third of suburban members did. The table 
also breaks down the suburban and overall votes by party. The 
results in the table show a clear division between the two parties 
that is even more dramatic among members located in the sub-
urbs, as suburban Republicans were especially likely to oppose 
the constitutional amendment. While about 30% of Republicans 
overall favored the plan, only 10% of suburban Republicans did. 
Suburban Democrats' voting patterns essentially reflected the 
larger party dynamics, however. 
3 Rick Pearson, "Taxes May Trip up School-Funding Panel," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 
1995,p.2-1. 
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TABLE! 
ILLINOIS 
COMBINED HOUSE & SENATE MEMBERS VOTING 
ON EDUCATION FUNDING, BY CATEGORY 
(in percents; raw numbers in parenthesis) 
t"" 
~ 
l1Q 
;;;· 
= 2' 
... 
~ 
("") 
::r ;:;· 
IIO 
l1Q 
0 
c,, 
C 
O" 
C 
... 
O" 
IIO 
"' 
,:; 
~ c,, 
"C C 
C O" 
:!:c 
-· ... ~ O" 
::I IIO 
"' ::I 
;; 
t::, 
~ 
= 0 ,., 
... 
IIO 
-"' 
1992 Constitutional Amendment to Increase State Responsiblity 
Yes 65 82 80 36 JO 95 29 92 
(109) (40) (47) (22) (4) (18) (21) (88) 
No 35 8 20 64 90 5 71 8 
(59) (9) (11) (39) (38) (I) (51) (8) 
1997 Income Tax Increase/Property Tax Cut Legislation 
Yes 53 93 54 28 6 75 12 90 
(62) (27) (21) (14) (2) (12) (7) (55) 
47 7 46 71 94 25 88 10 
No (56) (2) (18) (36) (32) ( 4) (50) (6) 
1995 Tax Cap Legislation 
Yes 74 50 (125) (20) 
No 26 50 (45) (20) 
69 89 
(37) (68) 
31 II 
(17) (8) 
100 
(61) 
0 
(0) 
47 99 40 
(7) (96) (29) 
53 I 60 
(8) (I) (40) 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Journal of the Illinois House 
of Representatives (1992, 1995, 1997), Journal of the Illinois Senate (I 992, 1995), 
Handbook of Illinois Government (1991, 1995, 1997). 
In 1997, Governor Jim Edgar proposed a plan to raise per-
sonal income tax rates 25% to increase and equalize school aid 
and provide some property tax relief.4 This bill passed the House 
• Rick Pearson and Courtney Challos, "Senate GOP Passes own School Plan," Chicago 
Tribune, 31 May 1997, p. 1-1. 
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but died in the Senate Revenue Committee on orders of suburban 
State Senate president Pate Philip, who feared that the bill would 
pass a floor vote (Wheeler 2003). Table 1 also breaks down the 
House vote on this bill by regional and party categories. The re-
sults generally parallel those in top rows of Table 1. First, as ex-
pected, suburban legislators were less likely to support this 
approach than were legislators from other regions. They claimed 
that the bill treated their school districts unfairly, because the tax 
relief received under the plan would not be enough to insure 
funding at current levels for wealthier areas. As one suburban 
state legislator, speaking in floor debate expressed it, "I came 
here with the idea that I wanted to help other children, but not at 
the expense of our own districts. Our homes will not be worth 
the money that they were if our education system goes down .... I 
cannot understand a system that is essentially going to bankrupt 
people that have large mortgages ... and then send our tax dollars 
across the state to fund other people" (State of Illinois 1997, 
COi-DOI). Second, as was true of the vote on the constitutional 
amendment described above, suburban Democrats and Republi-
cans differed greatly in their voting patterns. Specifically, 75% of 
suburban Democrats supported the plan, compared to only 6% of 
suburban Republicans. In a slight departure from the vote pattern 
on the constitutional amendment, however, suburban members 
from both parties were less likely than their counterparts from 
other regions to support this plan. 
In sum, the regional differences in education finance votes 
were as expected. Still, there were key differences among De-
mocratic and Republican legislators representing the suburbs, 
with Democrats more likely to support statewide funding 
schemes. These variations probably reflect the different impact 
that statewide funding would have on wealthier or poorer subur-
ban school districts, as suburban Democrats are most likely to 
represent "inner" suburbs or older industrial cities that have be-
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come incorporated into larger metropolitan areas. In fact, eleven 
of the fourteen suburban Chicago Democrats had districts based 
in Cook County, which also contains Chicago, and one of the 
remaining three represented Joliet, a former manufacturing cen-
ter. This pattern provides some evidence for the proposition that 
a city/inner suburban coalition will occur. At the time of this 
vote, Republicans maintained a slight edge, 13-11, in Cook 
County House districts, but dominated the Chicago suburbs out-
side of Cook, 18-3. 
Suburban opposition to statewide school funding schemes ex-
ists in tension with an aversion to property taxes. One way to 
resolve this tension is for suburban politicians to use their in-
creasing numbers to redirect existing funds toward districts they 
represent, at the expense of other regions. In Illinois, this sce-
nario has involved efforts to shift state school dollars to well-off 
suburban areas through property tax caps. For example, suburban 
House Republican leader Lee Daniels stated after the 1994 elec-
tions that he wanted to use his newly-achieved position as 
Speaker to cut suburban property taxes and replace the lost reve-
nue with more state school aid (Pearson 1994). He achieved par-
tial success the following year with legislation that capped 
property taxes in the Cook County suburbs of Chicago. Oppo-
nents of the cap included many Chicago and most downstate 
Democrats who feared that limiting local support for suburban 
schools would, in fact, trigger more aid from state sources.5 As 
one downstate legislator argued, "We know that this is going to 
allow for many of the school districts in northern Illinois who are 
much wealthier than ours to receive some portion of state in-
5 Rick Pearson and Susan Kuczka, "Edgar Makes Plans to Ink Cook Tax Cap," Chicago 
Tribune, 9 February 1995, p. 2-3. 
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crease, and I lrnow that there is only so much money in the pot'' 
(State of Illinois 1995, F05). 
Table 1 breaks down the vote on tax caps, combining both 
houses. It shows that, of the three regions, suburbs gave the 
measure the greatest support. Since Republicans from all regions 
supported the cap almost unanimously, this result reflects, in 
part, Republican numerical advantages in the suburbs (61 to 15 
among members voting on this bill). Here again, there are sub-
stantial differences between Republican and Democratic levels 
of support, with less than half of suburban Democrats voting for 
the bill, while all the suburban Republicans did. 
To summarize, Illinois' experience suggests that suburban 
legislators are less likely to support state-level school funding 
plans than are those from other regions, but they are more likely 
to favor holding down property taxes. "Inner" suburban Democ-
rats differ from "outer" suburban Republicans in their voting 
patterns, with the former more likely to be aligned, but not nec-
essarily in lock step with, predominantly city Democratic legisla-
tors. The sections that follow examine voting patterns on school 
finance issues in three other states to assess whether they are 
comparable to Illinois. 
COMPARISON TO MI CID GAN 
Michigan resembles Illinois in many respects. Both are large, 
industrial, rnidwestem states that struggled economically during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Similar to Illinois, Michigan politics has 
historically featured conflict between Detroit and "outstate" ar-
eas (Browne and VerBerg 1995, 36-37). As is also true in Illinois, 
legislative power in Michigan is shifting from the city to the sub-
urbs. In the late 1960s, for example, Detroit accounted for about 
22% of the members of the House of Representatives, while the 
suburbs claimed 28% and outstate areas the remaining 50%. By 
the 1990s, Detroit had fallen to 11 %, while the suburbs had in-
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creased to 35% and outstate areas had also increased to 54%. 
Changes in the Michigan Senate have been less dramatic, but 
reflect the same general trends. Finally, in the early 1990s, the 
two states had similar property tax levels, $914 per capita in Illi-
nois, v. $984 in Michigan (Hovey and Hovey 1997). Michigan 
was more dependent on the income tax, however, while Illinois 
had higher per capita sales taxes. 
There are some other differences between the two states as 
well. First, their political cultures vary. Michigan has a history of 
more moralistic politics than has been the case in Illinois, lead-
ing to a more issue-oriented politics and comparatively high 
spending on social programs (Browne and VerBerg 1995, 9-13). 
A second difference concerns the statewide political influence of 
each state's major city. Michigan does not have the tradition of 
boss rule that existed in Illinois, which has limited the Detroit 
mayor's influence in the state legislature (Browne and VerBerg 
1995, 37). While the Chicago machine was in its heyday under 
Richard J. Daley, Detroit was electing a nonpartisan mayor. Fi-
nally, unlike Illinois, Michigan made dramatic changes in its 
school funding system. 
Education finance was a prominent issue in Michigan since 
the 1970s. In 1971, Governor William Milliken proposed a prop-
erty tax/income tax swap, which failed in the legislature. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, voters rejected eight ballot 
proposals that would have limited property taxes, usually with a 
income tax or sales tax replacement (Kleine, et al. 1992). The 
issue became more prominent in the 1990s with the election of 
Governor John Engler, who had made property tax reduction a 
central focus of his 1990 gubernatorial campaign (Courant and 
Loeb 1997). In 1993, Engler backed a ballot proposal that would 
have cut property taxes for schools and replaced them with 
higher sales taxes. Opposition in the Detroit metropolitan area 
doomed this proposal to defeat. Wealthy suburbanites feared that 
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their schools would suffer under a more state-centered funding 
system, while voters in poorer urban areas rejected the sales tax 
• 6 
as regressive. 
Later that year the state legislature altered school financing 
by first abolishing the property tax, and then submitting an alter-
native scheme to the voters. Specifically, the ballot proposal fea-
tured a sales tax/cigarette tax increase. If that failed, an income 
tax hike to fund education would have automatically gone into 
effect. 
Table 2 shows the results of each vote for legislators in three 
categories, analogous to those used in Illinois: Detroit, outstate, 
and suburban. The vote for abolishing the property tax resembles 
the results reported in Table I for the Illinois property tax vote. 
Suburban legislators were the most likely to support abolition of 
the property tax, while city legislators were the least likely to do 
so. As in Illinois, the voting patterns of suburban Republicans 
and suburban Democrats differed substantially. Suburban Repub-
licans supported the abolition of property taxes almost unani-
mously, while the suburban Democrats gave it a much narrower 
majority. As in Illinois, this result suggests the possibility of a 
city/inner suburban alliance. It is also apparent, however, that 
Republicans in Michigan are even more united across regions 
than Democrats, suggesting that rural/outer suburban alliances 
are also possible. Table 2 also reports the Michigan legislature's 
vote on the funding source to replace the property tax. As in Illi-
nois, city legislators were most supportive and suburban legisla-
tors least so, although the differences are not as dramatic. Also, 
suburban Democrats were less likely to support this plan than 
suburban Republicans, perhaps because of its regressive over-
tones. Compared to the property tax abolition vote, suburban 
6 Mark Hornbeck, "Engler: Alienated Counties Killed 'A."' Detroit News, 4 June 1993, 
p. IA. 
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legislators' votes differed less according to party. Finally, the 
region's Democrats were much less likely to support the plan 
than those from the city, implying that the possible city/inner 
suburban alliance apparent on some other votes did not appear in 
this instance. 
In Illinois, suburban legislators, particularly Republicans, op-
posed statewide funding while supporting local property tax 
caps. In Michigan, a somewhat similar pattern was evident 
among suburban GOP members. These legislators, while sup-
porting both property tax elimination and statewide funding, 
TABLE2 
MICHIGAN 
COMBINED HOUSE AND SENATE MEMBERS VOTING ON 
EDUCATION FUNDING, BY CATEGORY 
(in percents; raw numbers in parenthesis) 
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Pro11erty Tax Abolition 
Yes 72 43 74 77 96 57 95 46 (100) (6) (58) (36) (23) (13) (70) (30) 
No 28 57 26 23 4 43 5 54 (39) (8) (20) (II) (I) (10) (4) (35) 
Sales Tax/Cigarette Tax Alternative Financing Proposal 
Yes 74 100 74 67 71 62 74 74 (97) (12) (55) (30) (17) (13) (55) (42) 
No 26 0 26 35 29 38 26 26 (34) (0) (19) (15) (7) (8) (19) (15) 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Journal of the Michigan 
House of Representatives (1993), Journal of the Michigan Sena{e (I 993), and 
Michigan Manual (1993). 
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were much more likely to favor the former than the latter. Al-
though the two proposals received almost identical levels of sup-
port in the legislature as a whole, 96% of suburban Republicans 
supported property tax elimination, while only 71 % supported 
the alternative financing mechanism. 
Ultimately, the proposal to increase sales and cigarette taxes 
to replace the now-defunct property tax as an education fmanc-
ing source went to the voters in March, 1994. Although, like its 
predecessor, it lost badly in Detroit, it did pass statewide and in 
suburban areas. The either/or nature of the ballot question, which 
would have forced an income tax hike if it were to have failed, 
probably explains this outcome, as a more progressive tax would 
have hit suburban areas relatively harder. 7 The proposal was 
most popular in outstate areas, winning 74.7% of the vote, com-
pared to 69.2% statewide. Not surprisingly, rural areas benefited 
the most from this plan. Suburban areas essentially broke even, 
while poorer urban areas saw little or no increase in school aid, 
but got a net tax increase due to the shift toward the sales tax 
(Courant and Loeb 1997). 
COMPARISON WITH GEORIGA 
In order to achieve further regional and cultural variation, the 
third state chosen for comparison is Georgia, a southern state 
with a traditionalistic political culture (Elazar 1984). Georgia has 
a higher minority population than Illinois or Michigan, a signifi-
cant fact, because ethnic diversity tends to undermine support for 
education spending (Poterba 1997; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
1999). As in 111inois and Michigan, reliance on property taxes 
and differences between rich and poor districts have been a con-
7 Mark Hornbeck and Charlie Cain, "Voters Overwhelmingly Back Sales Tax Increase," 
Detroit News, 16 March 1994, p. I A. 
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tinuing problem of the Georgia educational system (Fleischmann 
and Pierannunzi 1997, 287). Georgia also has a dominant metro-
politan area and a history of regional divisions in the state (Gim-
pel and Schuknecht 2002). During most of the post WWII era, 
these regional divisions have pitted Atlanta against rural areas, 
but as has been the case in Illinois, the suburbs have emerged as 
a third political force in the last few decades (Fleischmann and 
Pierannunzi 1997). Suburban representation in the state legisla-
ture is comparable to Illinois, at about 3 7% in the Senate and 
33% in the House in the 1990s. Georgia is less dependent on the 
property tax than Illinois, but more dependent on income taxes 
per capita. Sales taxes per capita in the two states are almost 
identical (Hovey and Hovey 2000). 
Beginning in 1985, Georgia operated under a school financ-
ing formula known as Quality Basic Education, which critics 
viewed as providing less than adequate state support and favor-
ing wealthy districts.8 After entering office in 1999, Governor 
Roy Barnes appointed a commission charged with making dra-
matic changes in the state's education funding system. The fol-
lowing year the legislature acted on recommendations of the 
commission, supported by the governor, which increased state 
funding for poorer districts and limited aid to some of the 
wealthiest districts in the state. To counter opposition to the pro-
posal from some Republican legislators representing relatively 
wealthy districts, the plan required a local match before the 
poorer districts would become eligible for more state funding, 
and increased funding for the majority of school districts.9 
8 Doug Cumming and James Salzer, "2000 Georgia Legislature: Barnes Finds Way To 
Sweeten Change in School Fund Gaps," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 15 January 
2000, p. 1-H; Doug Cumming, "Local Boards Want State to Increase School Funds." 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 24 June 1995, p. 8-C. 
9 Doug Cumming and James Salzer, supra. 
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Table 3 shows the combined results of the vote on this bill. 
Unlike in Illinois, the legislation passed fairly comfortably. Nev-
ertheless, the regional and party patterns are very similar. As was 
true in Illinois, suburban areas gave the measure the least sup-
port. Once again, there were dramatic differences between voting 
patterns of suburban Republicans and Democrats, with slightly 
over a third of Republicans supporting the plan and all suburban 
Democrats doing so. The fact that the voting patterns of city leg-
islators and suburban Democrats were perfectly in synch in this 
case supports the city/inner suburban coalition hypothesis. Fi-
naJly, as was true in Illinois, suburban Republicans were less 
likely to support this plan than were members of their party 
TABLE3 
GEORGIA 
COMBINED HOUSE AND SENATE MEMBERS VOTING 
ON EDUCATION FUNDING, BY CATEGORY 
(in percents; raw numbers in parenthesis) 
~ ~ 0 ... !. ::c ::c I'.""' ~ r:,, t::lr,, .. .. r:,, "Cl IIQ C C C '° C C ;;;· > c:r c:r c:r 3 c:r :!: ;- ~ ::c C -c 0 C II> ""I -· ""I n ""I ;:;· ... C n c:r ""I c:r C 
= ""I 
c:r II> II> IIO II> II> 
""I 
- !. "' ~ = a-= = .. II> "' "' 
Education Reform Package 
Yes 73 100 77 56 36 100 42 (164) (24) (99) (41) (18) (23) (41) 
No 27 0 23 44 64 0 58 (61) (0) (29) (32) (32) (0) (57) 
~ 
t::I 
.. 
3 
0 
n 
""I 
II> 
... 
"' 
97 
(123) 
4 
(4) 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Journal of the Georgia House 
of Representatives (2000), Journal of the Georgia Senate (2000), and Members of 
the Georgia General Assembly (1999). 
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statewide, arguing that the bill took away too much control from 
local districts. 10 
In interpreting Table 3, it is important to note that Georgia's 
education reform bill included reform measures that went be-
yond financing. Thus, it is difficult to be as sure that vote pat-
terns in the table reflect legislative preferences on school funding 
issues. It is possible to allay these fears somewhat by examining 
a failed Senate Amendment to the bill which would have kept the 
existing finance system in place. While losing 19-35, it carried 
the suburban region 12-8, while failing badly in the other two. 
All of the suburban supporters were Republicans. These patterns 
are consistent with those found in Illinois and Michigan. 
COMPARISON WITH MARYLAND 
Maryland has a political culture that combines traditionalistic 
and individualistic elements (Elazar 1989; Barone 2001). It is 
distinct from the other three states, however, in that the suburban 
areas dominate. Although, like the other states, it has a signifi-
cant central city (Baltimore), a majority of the state's population 
lives in suburban areas. The surban population is reflected in the 
legislature, as well. During the 1990s, both houses of the legisla-
ture had more than 70% of the members from the suburbs, com-
pared to around 40% in Illinois. Recent research by Gimpel and 
Schuknecht (2002) suggests that as suburbs grow, intra-suburban 
political battles replace those between other regions as sources of 
conflict. For example, education funding battles have pitted leg-
islators from the Washington suburbs against those from the Bal-
timore area. 11 Maryland has lower per capita property and sales 
10 James Salzer, "School Package Passes Senate," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 17 
March 2000, p. DI . . 
11 Michael Dresser, "$51 Million School Plan Wins Backing," Baltimore Sun, 14 Decem-
ber 1997, p. IB. 
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taxes than Illinois, but higher income taxes, ranking th4"d in the 
nation on the latter (Hovey and Hovey 2000). 
Like Illinois and the other states discussed above, Maryland 
has struggled with the school financing issue for a number of 
years. Since 1970, eleven commissions or task forces considered 
how to equalize educational funding, but most observers argue 
that the incremental changes that have been initiated have only 
made the problem worse. 12 Like Michigan and Georgia, Mary-
land has been more successful than Illinois in changing its fund-
ing formula to increase state support. In 2002 the legislature 
passed a new system that increased state aid to local districts 
35% over five years, financed largely through higher cigarette 
taxes, although questions remained about long-term funding sta-
bility. The legislation was based on the recommendations of the 
most recent study panel, the Thornton Commission, and occurred 
in a climate of fear that lawsuits would force action if the legisla-
ture did nothing. Baltimore City and rural schools were seen as 
the biggest winners from the plan. 13 
Table 4 shows a party and regional breakdown of the vote in 
Maryland. In contrast to Illinois and the other states, suburban-
ites were as willing to support statewide funding of schools as 
were those from other regions. Suburban willingness to support 
statewide funding may reflect the fact that Democrats dominated 
suburban districts in Maryland, unlike in the other states. Ironi-
cally, despite benefiting from the plan, rural legislators were less 
supportive. Maryland's voting patterns were similar to those in 
Illinois in the dramatic split between Republicans and Democrats 
in the suburbs voted, with the former overwhelmingly opposed 
and the latter strongly in favor of funding equalization. Once 
12 Howard Libit, "Schools Taking a Second Look at State Aid," Baltimore Sun, 18 June 
2000,p . l-B . 
13 Howard Libit, "Finding Funds for Education is Next Hurdle," Baltimore Sun, 8 April 
2002, p. 1-8. 
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TABLE4 
MARYLAND 
COMBINED HOUSE AND SENATE MEMBERS VOTING 
ON EDUCATION FUNDlNG, BY CATEGORY 
(in percents ; raw numbers in parenthesis) 
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Increase in State Aid to Schools 
Yes 66 100 13 67 13 89 12 85 (123) (32) (3) (88) (5) (83) (6) (117) 
No 34 0 87 33 87 II 88 15 (64) (0) (21) (43) (33) (10) (43) (21) 
Source: Author 's calculations based on data from the Journal of the Maryland 
House of Delegates (2002), Journal of the Maryland Senate (2002), and Maryland 
Manual (2001). 
again, these patterns are somewhat consistent with a city/inner-
suburban coalition or rural/outer suburban bloc . The two major 
suburban areas had different voting patterns, with legislators 
from the Washington suburbs supporting the plan 55-14, while 
those from the Baltimore suburbs supported it by a narrower 32-
30 margin. This result may, however, simply reflect the fact that 
Republicans make up a greater proportion of Baltimore suburban 
legislators (27 out of 62), than is the case in the Washington area 
(11 out of 69). 
CONCLUSION 
I have examined suburban legislators' voting patterns on 
questions related to education finance. In three of the four states 
suburban legislators were more likely to oppose statewide school 
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financing plans than were those from other regions, even though 
this opposition did not always mean that the legislation in ques-
tion failed. In Illinois and Michigan suburban legislators were 
less likely to support more state aid and to oppose higher local 
property taxes, as well. These tendencies were especially evident 
among suburban Republicans. Although it may seem paradoxical 
to oppose both state and local methods of financing education, 
the pattern is generally consistent with the predictions made ear-
lier in the article. 
The analysis of the four states reveals fairly consistent differ-
ences in voting behavior between suburban Republican legisla-
tors and their Democratic counterparts. The results imply that the 
suburbs are unlikely to become a monolithic, regional power 
bloc that dominates state policy decisions. In fact, the findings 
are consistent with the view that suburbs are becoming the po-
litical battleground of state politics, where both parties vie for 
support (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2002). 
Overall, then, the results suggest that party may be a rela-
tively more important factor than region in explaining voting 
patterns on school funding. In six of the seven votes analyzed, 
the differences between the percentages of Republicans and De-
mocrats voting for a bill was greater than the difference between 
suburban legislators and any other region. Nevertheless, subur-
ban Democrats' average margin of support differed from their 
party's average by at least 5% on four of the seven votes, while 
Republicans did so on three. The margin was greater than 10% 
on three of the seven votes for Democrats and one for Republi-
cans. Therefore, while party seems to make a bigger difference 
than region, region was important on some votes. 
The foregoing analysis also implies that Democrats are at 
least slightly more likely to let regional interests trump party 
unity than Republicans are. Thus, rural/outer suburban coalitions 
based in the Republican Party may be more significant than the 
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city/inner suburban mergers that some writers on urban politics 
anticipate. This result is especially significant, since Maryland is 
the only state where Democrats outnumbered Republicans in 
representing the suburbs, while the Republicans had a clear nu-
merical advantage in Illinois and Georgia. 
Two other points worth mentioning are implicit in the discus-
sion. First, demographic trends and regionalism interact with 
more long-tenn characteristics of a state's politics to shape pol-
icy. For example, it is probably no coincidence that Illinois was 
the least successful in altering school funding mechanisms, given 
its individualistic political culture. Second, suburban legislators 
can use their power at all stages of the legislative process, not 
just on fmal votes. In other words, as they become more numer-
ous and fiII more leadership positions, they will be in a better 
position to shape the legislation that comes up for a vote. 
Research on more states and issues is necessary before reach-
ing more definitive conclusions. At this point, however, given the 
partisan diversity of contemporary suburbs and the some-time 
split between inner and outer regions, it appears doubtful that 
suburban areas will be able to dominate state government in the 
way that some cities and rural areas have in the past. While this 
conclusion may be bad news for the suburbs, it probably has 
positive implications for state government performance more 
generally. When the interests of one region dominate, states may 
be less effective in playing the role of domestic policy innovators 
that many expect of them in the contemporary federal system. 
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